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Daniel Kostić
THE EXPLANATORY GAP ACCOUNT
AND INTELLIGIBILITY OF EXPLANATION1
SUMMARY: This paper examines the explanatory gap account. The key notions for its 
proper understanding are analysed.  In particular, the analysis is concerned with the role of 
“thick” and “thin” modes of presentation and “thick” and “thin” concepts which are 
relevant for the notions of “thick” and “thin” conceivability, and to that effect relevant for 
the gappy and non-gappy identities. The last section of the paper discusses the issue of the 
intelligibility of explanations. One of the conclusions is that the explanatory gap account 
only succeeds in establishing the epistemic gap. The claim that psychophysical identity is 
not intelligibly explicable, and thus opens the explanatory gap, would require an indepen-
dent argument which would prove that intelligible explanations stem only from conceptual 
analysis.  This, I argue, is not the case.
KEY WORDS: The explanatory gap, the epistemic gap, modes of presentation, conceiv-
ability, possibility, intelligibility of explanation.
“On the one hand, we have excellent reason for thinking that 
conscious experience must be reducible, in the requisite sense, to a 
physical phenomenon, and, on the other hand, we don't see how it 
could be.” (Levine 2001, p. 175).
This paper is concerned with the explanatory gap account (Levine 1983, 1993, 
2001). At its core the problem we are about to tackle is that physicalism could be 
true and we still would not be able to know how that could be. As Joseph Levine 
puts it:“…we have excellent reasons for thinking that mental phenomena, including 
conscious experience, must be a species of physical/natural phenomena. On the 
other hand, we also have excellent reasons for thinking conscious experience 
cannot be captured in physical/natural terms” (Levine 2001, pp. 9–10). As we shall 
see, Levine powerfully argues that although the entailment from conceivability to 
metaphysical possibility of zombies in the conceivability arguments, cannot be 
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established, materialism is still not off the hook because this claim needs a further 
argument that would explain how the same property can instantiate two semantical-
ly different concepts.
I start off laying out the explanatory gap account by examining some technical 
terms Levine (2001) has introduced. The first on our agenda is the difference 
between “thick” and “thin” modes of presentation and “thick” and “thin” concepts. 
After that I will be examining notions of “thick” and “thin” conceivability, ascrip-
tive and non-ascriptive modes of presentation, then gappy and non-gappy identities, 
and finally in the last section I will be concerned with the issue of the intelligibility 
of explanations. Let’s begin with “thick” and “thin” concepts and modes of 
presentation. 
1. Thick and thin concepts and modes of presentations
To understand this idea one must realize that the ways in which we conceptual-
ly grasp properties determine the way in which the explanation of a given phe-
nomenon works. One can think of the ways in which we think about content of our 
experience as modes of presentation (Levine 2001, p. 8). Levine claims that this 
point becomes really obvious when one considers the modes of presentation that 
are employed when we think about natural kinds and about qualities of our own 
experiences. In the case of natural kinds the mode of presentation is representation-
ally “thin”, i.e. our cognitive relation to the content of experience of a natural kind 
bears nothing substantial or determinate apart from the informational presentation 
and perhaps relation to other presentationally “thin” properties. Take for example a 
concept of a cat. There are two things that are relevant for the mode of presentation 
here. On the one hand, there is a mental symbol “cat” and on the other hand, there 
is some kind of a nomic relation between that symbol and a property of being a cat. 
Obviously, the symbol “cat” plays some cognitive role, but that is not determinate 
for the content of a concept of cat. What is more important for the content of a 
natural kind concept is its relation to “cathood”. In this sense, there is nothing 
substantial or determinate about our cognitive relation with natural kinds concepts 
and that is why they are presentationally “thin”. 
Contrary to this, our cognitive relation to the content of phenomenal experience 
is substantive and determinate, so in this sense it is presentationally “thick”. In a 
way, the experience itself serves as its own mode of presentation in this case, for if 
it were not present the relevant concept could not be formed. This is what is meant 
by the term “substantive”. To say that a mode of presentation is determinate, means 
that it presents certain and specific quality in its own right. In the case of “thick” 
modes of presentation cognitive significance is more relevant for the content of a 
concept than the information about the relation of a property it represents with 
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other properties. Having distinguished “thin” and “thick” modes of presentation we 
can say now that phenomenal concepts are “thick” concepts because they rely on 
the “thick” modes of presentation. On the other hand, natural kind concepts are 
“thin” concepts because they are based on the “thin” modes of presentation. That is, 
our cognitive access to the representation of a situation is not in any significant way 
tied to the experience of that situation. On the other hand, in the case of psy-
chophysical identity our cognitive access to the phenomenal side plays a significant 
part of the concept of experience. In this case we have a “thick” concept. 
The difference between thick and thin concepts in Levine’s account comes 
down to this: the semantics of the thick concepts is determined by modes of 
presentation wherein a state or a quality presents itself regardless of the nomic 
relations a given property might have with other properties. In other words, one 
could have a thick concept of experience without knowing anything about the 
nomic or causal relations of the property it picks out with other properties. On the 
other hand, one could have a thin concept without having the determinate and 
substantial cognitive access to the content of a thin concept. This situation plays an 
essential role in the conceivability arguments as well.  
What is meant by the claim that the physicalist explanation leaves out some-
thing is that the two ways in which thin and thick concepts are determined seem 
incompatible. Natural kind concepts/thin concepts are based on the descriptions of 
the causal or nomic roles their referents play, whereas phenomenal/thick concepts 
are based on the immediate and determinate quality of experience that in a sense 
presents itself. 
Why should this be a problem? 
Levine holds that the problem lies in the fact that one of the plausible explana-
tions could be that these two ways in which we pick out properties reflect the 
metaphysical gap between the phenomenal and the physical properties. On the 
other hand, given that we have very good reasons to believe that materialism is true 
based on the causal argument (Papineau 2002), the incompatibility of thick and thin 
concepts render the psychophysical identity unintelligible even if it were true. We 
will come to this point very soon. Let’s continue with laying out Levine’s account. 
2. Ascriptive and non-ascriptive modes of presentation 
    and apriority and necessity
Our next issues are the modal and epistemological aspects of the explanatory 
gap problem. Levine’s idea about the relation between these two notions can best 
be articulated through his analysis of the conceivability arguments. 
Starting off with the terminological clarifications about what is meant by 
“metaphysically possible” or “logically possible”, Levine (Levine 2001, p. 40) 
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argues that there is no real distinction between them. For him the logically possible 
is metaphysically possible, or just plainly possible. Instead of that he introduces the 
distinction between logically/metaphysically possible and conceptually possible. 
The crucial distinction here is between “situations” and our modal judgments about 
them. The modal status of a “situation” is mind independent, that is to say they 
could be metaphysically possible without us knowing about it. On the other hand, 
when a “situation’s” modal status is dependent on our judgements then it is 
conceptually possible. This point will come very handy later on in presenting 
Levine’s account of what follows from the conceivability arguments. Suffice it say 
that it obviously follows from these considerations that a “situation” cannot be 
metaphysically necessary without being conceptually necessary. A very important 
distinction here is what Levine takes the connection between the epistemological 
and metaphysical sides of modality to be. 
These distinctions are based on the dependency of our modal judgements upon 
our epistemic situation. For example, someone could be in a position to judge it as 
necessary that H2O contains hydrogen and that water contains hydrogen. But 
someone else who is ignorant of the chemical composition of water would not 
judge it as necessary, because that person would not know the relevant description 
of the causal roles under which both “water” and “H2O” pick out the same thing, 
that is she would be unaware of the bridging claim that “water=H2O”. That is to 
say, our judgements about factual and modal descriptions of the situations are 
relative to the representations that we use to pick those situations out. Naturally, a 
“situation” in this context is taken to mean “an object instantiating one or more 
properties or an ordered n-tuple of objects that serve as the truth conditions for a 
statement” (Levine 2001, p. 40), that is, a “situation” allows us to evaluate a 
statement as true or false. Now comes an important part of the argumentation. It is 
the relation between conceptual possibility and metaphysical possibility. A situation 
S, is conceptually possible, iff when thought of under the representation R, it is 
possible. On the other hand, a situation S’ is metaphysically possible iff S’ is 
conceptually possible under representation R and it is not a priori that not-R 
(Levine 2001, p. 40). A simple principle then follows, if there is a description of a 
situation according to which the situation is conceptually impossible, then it is 
metaphysically impossible (Levine 2001, p. 46). 
Let me clarify a very important point about a priority and necessity in this 
context. Consider a statement “Water contains hydrogen”. To render this statement 
necessary, three crucial requirements must be met. First, that the statement “H2O 
contains hydrogen” is a priori, i.e. that its truth or falsity can be evaluated solely on 
the ground of the meaning of the terms involved. Second, that there is an empirical-
ly discoverable fact, thus a posteriori, that water is H2O. Finally, the third require-
ment is that the statement picks out a situation in which water contains H2O. Based 
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on these preliminaries we evaluate a statement as necessary even if it is a 
posteriori. That is, to render an a posteriori statement necessary, there has to be an 
a priori description from which that statement can be derived. This is so at least in 
the case of natural kinds. 
In a sense each statement that is metaphysically necessary must be also 
conceptually necessary, and if a statement is conceptually impossible it is meta-
physically impossible. Thus far this seems obvious. On the other hand, a statement 
that is metaphysically impossible is not necessarily conceptually impossible as we 
have seen in the case of water/H2O. That is to say, if a situation is conceptually 
possible that fact alone does not justify entailment to metaphysical possibility. 
Basically, this point follows from the claim that the only way we can evaluate a 
situation’s modal status is through a representation of the given situation. In 
Levine’s view (Levine 2001, p. 46), the fact that conceptual possibility does not 
entail metaphysical possibility is exemplified by all cases of a posteriori necessity. 
If physicalism were true it should also fall in this category. 
So how does this account relate to conceptual and metaphysical necessity? 
Basically, this account comes down to two-dimensional semantics. What is concep-
tually possible is in Chalmers’s lingo 1-possible and what is metaphysically 
possible is 2-possible. What happens in Levine’s analysis of the conceivability 
arguments is not much different from the two-dimensional analysis, at least in 
terms of basic conceptual assumptions. The point where Levine departs from the 
standard interpretation of the conceivability arguments is with the epistemic 
assumptions. Namely, Levine claims that unlike the identities of natural kinds, 
wherein our epistemic situation is “thin”, in the case of phenomenal concepts our 
epistemic situation is “thick” which makes the psychophysical identity a gappy 
identity. I will explain what a “gappy” identity is in a moment. Before that I just 
need to crudely elaborate on Levine’s departure from the standard interpretation of 
the conceivability arguments. If the “thick” concepts are not based on the modes of 
presentation that involve nomic or causal relations between properties, then it is 
possible in principle that a characterization of a counterfactual situation containing 
“thick” concepts might be missing some relevant description, i.e. a description that 
could render the counterfactual situation metaphysically impossible. This in fact 
leads only to the conceptual possibility of zombies. Because the “thick” concepts 
are flanking on the one side of the psychophysical identity, that kind of identity is 
“gappy”. It is very interesting to note that the very same assumption about the 
phenomenal concepts that supports the metaphysical and anti-materialist conclu-
sions of the conceivability arguments is employed here to block the inference to 
metaphysical possibility. 
Another way of explicating this view is through the analysis of the modes of 
presentation. Namely, Levine (Levine 2001, p. 54) distinguishes between ascriptive 
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and non-ascriptive modes of presentation. Ascriptive modes of presentation are 
those we are already familiar with from Kripke and Chalmers’s versions of the 
conceivability argument. According to ascriptivists the concepts pick out their 
referents via the descriptions of their standard causal or functional roles. The point 
that clearly distinguishes between ascriptivists and non-ascriptivists is that whereas 
ascriptivist believes that the a priori knowledge is a matter of having enough 
information about the causal or functional roles properties normally play, a non-
ascriptivist maintains that a priori knowledge cannot be founded in such a way.  
On the other hand, the non-ascriptive mode of presentation works in such a 
way that the content of a concept is determined by the formal relations a given 
property has with other properties.
3. Thick and thin conceivability 
Let’s turn our attention now to rather technical aspects of the explanatory gap 
account. The claim that the conceivability argument only establishes an epistemic 
possibility of counterfactual scenarios has been a subject of many vigorous debates 
over the years2. For the purpose of this paper and sake of brevity we won’t go into 
details of these debates. However the argument that separates the epistemic 
possibility from the metaphysical one needs to be rehearsed. 
This issue is of central importance to the explanatory gap account and now we 
will consider it in some detail. We have seen in the contrasting cases of natural kind 
identities that the conceivability argument breaks down when it comes to the 
entailment from conceivability to possibility and that it goes right through in the 
qualia case. According to Levine’s interpretation of the argument, it is so because 
metaphysical possibility relies upon conceptual possibility. Namely, we get to the 
metaphysical possibility not directly from conceivability but through conceptual 
possibility first. The notion of conceptual possibility only requires that a counter-
factual situation that we are conceiving of should not be inconsistently inferable 
from the situation we start with. If a situation is conceptually possible, it is meta-
physically possible as well (Levine 1998, p. 454). Since there is no inconsistency in 
conceiving of a situation “brain state B but not quale M” it is then conceptually 
possible that “brain state B but not quale M”, and if this is conceptually possible 
then it is metaphysically possible. This is the standard “metaphysical reading” of 
the explanatory gap according to Levine.  What he needs now is a move that 
undermines the inferential link between conceptual and metaphysical possibility, 
thus establishing only epistemic possibility of counterfactual cases of qualia. 
2 Cf. (Chalmers & Jackson 2001), (Block & Stalnaker 1999), (Stoljar 2000, 2001), (Levine 1998, 
2001), (Balog 1999), (Hill 1997), etc.
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Levine argues that there could be two ways to understand the inferential link, by 
analyzing the ways concepts connect to their referents, or the concept’s modes of 
presentation (Levine 1998, pp. 457-8). On the one hand they could involve ascrip-
tive modes of presentation and on the other non-ascriptive modes of presentation 
(Levine 1998, 2001). Ascriptive modes of presentation are, normally, involved in 
standard cases of natural kind identity, wherein we have two distinct concepts that 
pick out the same thing. This case involves ascription of properties to the referent 
by way of instantiating the properties that are referred to; for example, the causal 
roles of water. The non-ascriptive mode of presentation uses other methods. The 
crucial difference between the two is that in the case of ascriptive mode the 
properties are only contingently related to each other. Whereas in the case of the 
non-ascriptive mode properties are related in some other way and not necessarily 
cognitively represented. According to Levine, we only need non-ascriptive modes 
of presentation to undermine the link between conceptual possibility and metaphys-
ical possibility in the case of zombies (Levine 1998, 2001), because if they are non-
ascriptive then we cannot know whether something is missing from the zombie 
description and therefore allowing for the inconsistent description of zombies. In 
other words, non-ascriptive modes of presentation undermine the inference from 
conceptual possibility to metaphysical possibility.  
To see more clearly how this blocking works let’s consider it in terms of 
conceivability. Levine distinguishes two grades of conceivability: thin and thick 
conceivability (Levine 1998, p. 468; 2001). A thinly conceivable situation is based 
on a plain conceptual possibility, i.e. a situation is thinly conceivable iff it is not 
inconsistent to infer it from the actual situation. On the other hand, a situation is 
thickly conceivable if it is conceptually possible and if any inference from its 
conceptual possibility to metaphysical possibility is based on gappy identities3. In 
this way the link between conceivability and metaphysical possibility is under-
mined. 
This view is unfortunate for the materialists because it implies that the only 
way to defend materialism is by conceding on the gappy psychophysical identity. 
On the other hand, to say that a situation is epistemically possible is to say that 
there is nothing in our knowledge that would make it metaphysically impossible. 
4. Gappy and non-gappy identities
The point of gappy and non-gappy identities comes down to this: gappy 
identities require some explanation of how these two concepts pick out the same 
property. Non-gappy identities imply distinct properties. If zombies are conceivable 
3 I will explain this notion in the next section. 
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then it is so because either psychophysical identity is a gappy identity or there is no 
identity after all. Now how does this stop the flow from conceptual possibility to 
metaphysical possibility? In the natural kinds cases a situation can be conceptually 
possible but metaphysically impossible nevertheless. If we want to break the 
inference from conceptual possibility to metaphysical possibility in the case of 
qualia, we need to use gappy identities and claim that proper identities need no 
explanation of their truthfulness. However, it is because of this manoeuvre that we 
need a further explanation of how the two distinct concepts pick out the same 
property. This is what is meant by the claim that the explanatory gap saves materi-
alism from the metaphysical consequences of conceivability arguments but at the 
price of the explanatory gap. 
Levine claims that there are two main aspects of the explanatory gap. One 
involving incompatibility of thick and thin concepts and the other involving 
gappiness of the psychophysical identity, which is based on the intelligibility of the 
further request for an explanation. My idea is that gappiness in Levine’s case is 
actually based on the idea of incompatibility of thick and thin concepts which in 
effect dissolves very easily when we realise that the intelligibility of explanation 
need not stem directly from the identity. Thus this account only succeeds in 
establishing the epistemic gap-a merely descriptive gap between two semantically 
distinct concepts. 
5. Intelligibility of explanations
The explanatory gap account is supposed to show that the metaphysical 
conclusions standardly drawn from the conceivability arguments do not hold but at 
the price of the explanatory gap. To elaborate on this point Levine (Levine 2001) 
distinguishes between two aspects of an explanation: the metaphysical explanation, 
according to which we explain property A in virtue of property B, and an epistemo-
logical explanation, which is supposed to explain why property A is explicable in 
virtue of property B. In another words, epistemological explanation makes it 
intelligible why given B there is A. They are of course interconnected and interde-
pendent, but it is crucial to note that they are not the same thing. For example, if 
one were to try explaining my visual experience of a red tomato metaphysically, the 
explanation would appeal to the fact that at certain point in time t, when I had an 
experience S, my brain was occupying a state B at t. However, to make this 
explanation intelligible we need a theory of realization that would tell us how B 
realizes A, according to Levine. 
There is another aspect of the explanatory gap, which concerns mainly the 
issue of explanations and identities. Take, for example, our contrasting cases of 
natural kinds and phenomenal kinds. Levine (Levine 2001, 2007) agrees that proper 
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identities need no additional or further explanations. If being in a brain state B were 
the same as having a “reddish” quale Q, then it doesn’t make much sense to ask 
what makes this identity statement true. However, it is legitimate to ask why given 
brain state B there is the quale Q. In the case of natural kinds an answer to this 
question can take only two routes according to Levine (Levine 2001, p. 81). One 
way to explain it is by relying on the basic or fundamental law; the other way is 
through the identity premise itself. 
Let’s turn our attention now to the issue of explanation in the explanatory gap 
and try to connect the notions elaborated above. 
Levine (Levine 1983, p. 357) argues that even if we succeeded in explaining 
the causal or functional roles of qualia, there is still the qualitative character of our 
sensory experiences that is left out by this sort of explanation. For a property to be 
left out from a theory mean that the theory cannot refer to these properties (Levine 
1993, p. 121). Unlike cases of identities of natural kinds, like water and H2O or heat 
and molecular motions, wherein a requirement for further explanation does not 
seem intelligible, because the seeming contingency can be explained away by either 
deriving the identity from more fundamental statements or dismissed as a misde-
scription, in the case of qualia this requirement does make very much sense. Levine 
(1999) holds that most of the natural kind identities are not self-evidently explica-
ble either, and that we can legitimately ask for further explanation. However, after 
providing the descriptions from which the natural kinds flanking the identity 
statement are derived, we come to realize that the request for further explanation is 
just a request for a justification. On the other hand, in the qualia case no derivation 
seems possible and the puzzlement about how qualia and brain processes could be 
identical deepens even more as we add refinement to our concepts of qualia or of 
brain processes. Levine holds that it is so because the psychophysical identity is a 
“gappy identity” (Levine 1998, 1999, 2001). A gappy identity is an identity 
statement which makes it intelligible to request for further explanation. Of course, 
non-gappy identity is the one for which it is not intelligible to require further 
explanation. To illustrate this point let’s compare two patterns of explanation. One 
involving the boiling point of water and the other involving the presence of the 
reddish quale. Let’s start with the boiling point of water:
I.“H2O molecules exert vapor pressure P at kinetic energy E;II.  At sea level exerting vapor pressure P causes molecules to rapidly escape into 
air;
III. Rapidly escaping into air is boiling;
IV. 100°C is kinetic energy E;
V. Water is H2O;VI. Water boils at 100°C at sea level.” (Levine 1999, p.4)
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This is clearly the case of a non-gappy identity according to Levine. One can 
legitimately ask why V. is true, but once we provide enough details of the causal 
roles of water, or we fill in the microphysical description of the behaviour of water, 
it seizes to make sense to ask for further explanation. In a sense, scheme of the 
causal roles of water and sufficiently refined microphysical description exhaust all 
there is about an explanation of the natural kinds identity. We are not left with a 
sense that something is missing. It is, however, crucial to note that in this example 
V. serves as a binding point for the reference of water and H2O in the explanation. It 
identifies the phenomenon to be explained with a phenomenon that is describable in 
terms of microphysics. It enables V. to be derivable from the combination of 
statements that are either a priori or are descriptions of the underlying microphysi-
cal phenomena, which in effect makes it unintelligible to ask for further explana-
tion of V.’s truth. Furthermore, if we try to abstract the formal structure of the 
derivation, it comes down to this:
VII.  “Water is the stuff that manifests the “watery” properties;
VIII. H2O manifests “watery” properties;IX. Water is H2O.” (Levine 1999, p. 5)
It is important to note that premise VII. is analytic and that the characterization 
of properties in question is given in “topic neutral” terms. To say that premise 26. 
is analytic in this context means that one can know it is true solely on the ground of 
knowing what the terms involved mean. “Topic neutral” here means simply that the 
terms that pick out properties in question do not contain any vocabulary that is not 
contained in the theory that does the explaining. These two features of the binding 
premise are crucial for the derivation, because ultimately, the explaining of the 
identity must end up either with the fundamental law or it has to be derived from 
the identity premise itself, otherwise it would not be an explanation at all. Let’s 
now consider the case of reddish quale.
X. “S occupies brain state B;
XI. Occupying brain state B is to experience a reddish quale;
XII. S is experiencing a reddish quale.“ (Ibid)
In this case we have a gappy identity. Regardless of the amount of detail that 
we could stack in between X. and XI. it still makes sense to ask why is XI. true. It 
is because of the nature of the binding premise XI. As we have seen, premise VII. 
enables the macro phenomenon to refer to the microphysical descriptions or to the 
combination of analytic statements. Premise XI., however, considered as a binding 
premise, the premise that is supposed to identify the phenomenon that is to be 
explained with the microphysical description or with a combination of analytic 
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statements, is not derivable from the combinations of analytic definitions. Let’s 
have a look at what would formal structure of the derivation look like in this case. 
XIII. “Qualitative state R is the state that plays causal role C;
XIV. Brain state B plays causal role C;
XV. Brain state B is qualitative state R. (Levine 1999, p. 6)
Here, the premise XIII. should be analytic for the derivation to work. However, 
it is not analytic, although it may be that some qualitative states play certain causal 
or functional roles, but even if they do it is not the conceptual truth. In Levine’s 
terms the premise XIII. that is supposed to be a binding premise is actually an 
example of a gappy identity. It is in fact in need of further explanation. It just seems 
coherently conceivable that there could be a conscious experience that does not 
play the typical causal or functional role for the related state. No other corrobora-
tion for the assumptions is provided. 
 We have come to the crucial point of the account. Given that it is coherently 
conceivable that qualia could not play their typical causal or functional roles, this 
only shows that the claims about their typical causal or functional roles are not 
analytic, which suffices only for establishing the explanatory gap. The conceivabili-
ty argument itself does not demonstrate the metaphysical possibility of causal or 
functional dissociations. To establish metaphysical possibility in the conceivability 
argument a new argument would be required. 
Now it becomes clearer what it means for the physicalist explanation of 
phenomenal consciousness to leave out something. Namely, physical-empirical 
explanations are supposed to use “thin” concepts whose semantics is based on the 
modes of presentation that bear very little on the cognitive significance in picking 
out their referents. On the other hand phenomenal concepts almost entirely depend 
on the “thick” modes of presentation, wherein a property basically presents itself 
and the mode of presentation is almost exhausted in the cognitive significance. 
“Thin” concepts leave out the content of “thick” concepts. More importantly, “thin” 
concepts cannot include the content of “thick” concepts in principle. 
Why should this be a problem? Well, that is exactly Levine’s point. This 
situation does not create a metaphysical problem because it is perfectly reasonable 
that the same property can be picked out in two different ways. For example, we 
can conceptualize our experiences in terms of the causal roles brain states or 
properties normally play and, on the other hand, in terms of picking out their 
immediate qualities. However, claims Levine, this creates an epistemological 
problem because why the content of a particular “thick” concept is as it is not 
intelligible, given the content of a respective “thin” concept and also given that 
both concepts pick out the same thing. Furthermore, exactly because of the relation 
between the “thick” and the “thin” concepts, the conceivability arguments fail to 
establish the metaphysical possibility of counterfactual causal, supervenience 
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dissociations or causal or functional inversions. This according to Levine is the 
price physicalists have to pay if they were to avoid the metaphysical consequences 
of the conceivability arguments. 
However, why would physicalists concede on this rather high price for the truth 
of physicalism? Levine claims that fully intelligible/non-gappy explanation of the 
psychophysical identity ought to rely on what he calls ascriptive modes of presenta-
tion. Given that phenomenal concepts, or as he calls them thick concepts, use non-
ascriptive modes of presentation, the psychophysical identity is rendered a gappy 
identity and thus cannot be fully intelligible. But this intelligibility requirement is 
not justified. It rather rests on a presupposition that intelligible explanation of the 
psychophysical identity must come from the conceptual analysis alone. In another 
words, an explanation ought to identify explanans and explanandum via a scheme 
of descriptions of the causal or functional roles in order to be fully explanatory. 
That is to say, it needs to include a two step approach which consists of working 
out a scheme of causal or functional roles and then finding the role fillers. Some 
philosophers, such as Chalmers (Chalmers 1996, 2009), and Chalmers and Jackson 
(Chalmers and Jackson 2000) maintain that these two steps should even a priori 
follow from the complete physical information.  However, if this sort of analysis is 
available for the natural kinds identities it is not clear why a mere existence of the 
epistemic gap would be an obstacle for such analysis in the case of the psychophys-
ical identity. This view rests on the assumption that ascriptive modes of presenta-
tion, that use descriptions of causal or functional roles, actually imply a difference 
in properties. Ned Block calls it metaphysical modes of presentation as opposed to 
cognitive modes of presentation. However, my point here is that we could have a 
true identity that involves thick and thin concepts which are based on distinct 
cognitive modes of presentation rather than on metaphysical modes presentation 
(which would in fact imply a metaphysical difference in properties). 
This is a recurring objection in philosophy of mind, that began with the 
anecdotal account of the remark Max Black gave to J.J.C. Smart (Smart 1959). 
Basically Max Black objected that if one is to postulate an identity between the 
phenomenal and the physical then the concepts flanking the identity sign that 
deploy independent modes of presentation are based on distinct properties in virtue 
of which these modes of presentation differ. What seems to be the problem here is 
that phenomenal concept needs to have a phenomenal mode of presentation which 
ought not be physical, that is, it should not be the property itself. Levine seems to 
be claiming this as well. Nevertheless, as Ned Block  (Block 2007) has powerfully 
argued, distinct concepts flanking the identity sign need not be based on metaphysi-
cally distinct properties. The view that they do rests on an assumption that neces-
sary, a difference in cognitive modes of presentation entails a difference in meta-
physical modes of presentation. This shouldn’t be the case according to Block. 
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Cognitive modes of presentation do not necessary entail metaphysical modes of 
presentation. He presents a scenario which corroborates this claim. Imagine there 
was a student who wanted to learn French. He is an absolute beginner. One day his 
teacher shows him a cat and says that a French word for cat is “chat”. Later on the 
same day the absentminded teacher shows the same cat to the student and again 
introduces the “chat” for cat. The student thinks it is a different cat and he asso-
ciates the first appearance of cat with a concept “chat1” and second appearance 
with “chat2”. He sincerely believes there is a metaphysical defence between two 
appearances of the cat. But we see from this example that there was only one cat 
and the student acquired the concept “chat” under two cognitively distinct modes of 
presentation. In this case the difference in cognitive modes of presentation did not 
entail a difference in metaphysical modes of presentation. This proves that the 
entailment from cognitive to metaphysical modes of presentation is not necessary 
and furthermore this explanation makes psychophysical identity fully intelligible. 
The other problem with the explanatory gap account is that it rests on an 
assumption that fully intelligible explanations must be based only on the conceptual 
analysis. This requirement is not justified either. As it was established earlier, we 
could think about consciousness from the first and from the third person perspec-
tive, i.e. we can use thick or thin concepts of our experience and have an indepen-
dent account of its intelligibility, because as we saw, identities are not explanatory 
to begin with.  
In conclusion, the explanatory gap account only succeeds in establishing the 
epistemic gap. The claim that psychophysical identity is not completely intelligibly 
explicable, and thus opens the explanatory gap, would require an independent 
argument which would prove that intelligible explanations stem only from concep-
tual analysis. This, as we have seen, is not the case, even with the natural kinds. 
Identities are not explanatory in themselves. Their purpose is to transfer causal or 
explanatory force onto the other properties. However, if one finds the epistemic gap 
baffling, one ought not to infer the explanatory gap directly from it. Intelligibility 
of the psychophysical identity should not be sought in the conceptual analysis, but 
elsewhere. I suggest looking into the workings of psychological concepts of 
phenomenal consciousness and study why would one expect that phenomenal 
concepts/thick concepts should be based on the descriptions of the causal/functional 
roles in order to be fully explanatory. 
Daniel Kostić
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Daniel Kostić
Tumačenje objašnjavalačkog jaza i razumljivost objašnjenja
(Apstrakt)
Ovaj tekst se bavi tumačenjem objašnjavalačkog jaza, analizirajući ključne pojmove za 
njeno razumevanje. Analiza se posebno bavi ulogom “thick” i “thin” (“punih” i “tankih”) 
modova prezentacije i “thick” i “thin” pojmova koji su bitni za razumevanje “thick” i “thin” 
tipove zamislivosti, i samim tim bitni za “gappy” i “ne-gappy” identitete. Konačno, u 
poslednjem delu ovog teksta ispituje se problem razumljivosti objašnjenja. Jedan od 
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zaključaka je da teorija objašnjavalačkog jaza uspeva da dokaže samo epistemički jaz. 
Tvrdnja da psihofizički identitet nije razumljivo objašnjiv, čime se otvara objašnjavalački 
jaz, zahtevala bi nezavisan argument koji bi dokazao da razumljiva objašnjenja proizlaze 
isključivo iz pojmovne analize. Ja dokazujem da ovo nije slučaj. 
KLJUČNE REČI: Objašnjavalački jaz, epistemički jaz, modovi prezentacije, zamislivost, 
mogućnost, razumljivost objašnjenja.
